Monday, May 09, 2005

Impeachable offenses


Special to BuzzFlash
Thursday, May 5, 2005
By Greg Palast

Here it is. The smoking gun. The memo that has "IMPEACH HIM" written all over

The top-level government memo marked "SECRET AND STRICTLY PERSONAL," dated eight
months before Bush sent us into Iraq, following a closed meeting with the
President, reads, "Military action was now seen as inevitable. Bush wanted to
remove Saddam through military action justified by the conjunction of terrorism
and WMD. But the intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy."

Read that again: "The intelligence and facts were being fixed...."

For years, after each damning report on BBC TV, viewers inevitably ask me,
"Isn't this grounds for impeachment?" -- vote rigging, a blind eye to terror
and the bin Ladens before 9-11, and so on. Evil, stupidity and self-dealing are
shameful but not impeachable. What's needed is a "high crime or misdemeanor."

And if this ain't it, nothing is.

The memo uncovered this week by the Times, goes on to describe an elaborate plan
by George Bush and British Prime Minister Tony Blair to hoodwink the planet into
supporting an attack on Iraq knowing full well the evidence for war was a phony.

A conspiracy to commit serial fraud is, under federal law, racketeering.
However, the Mob's schemes never cost so many lives.

Here's more. "Bush had made up his mind to take military action. But the case
was thin. Saddam was not threatening his neighbors, and his WMD capability was
less than that of Libya, North Korea or Iran."

Really? But Mr. Bush told us, "Intelligence gathered by this and other
governments leaves no doubt that the Iraq regime continues to possess and
conceal some of the most lethal weapons ever devised."

A month ago, the Silberman-Robb Commission issued its report on WMD intelligence
before the war, dismissing claims that Bush fixed the facts with this snooty,
condescending conclusion written directly to the President, "After a thorough
review, the Commission found no indication that the Intelligence Community
distorted the evidence regarding Iraq's weapons."

We now know the report was a bogus 618 pages of thick whitewash aimed to let
Bush off the hook for his murderous mendacity.

Read on: The invasion build-up was then set, says the memo, "beginning 30 days
before the US Congressional elections." Mission accomplished.

You should parse the entire memo -- reprinted below -- and see if you can make
it through its three pages without losing your lunch.

Now sharp readers may note they didn't see this memo, in fact, printed in the
New York Times. It wasn't. Rather, it was splashed across the front pages of
the Times of LONDON on Monday.

It has effectively finished the last, sorry remnants of Tony Blair's political
career. (While his Labor Party will most assuredly win the elections Thursday,
Prime Minister Blair is expected, possibly within months, to be shoved
overboard in favor of his Chancellor of the Exchequer, a political execution
which requires only a vote of the Labour party's members in Parliament.)

But in the US, barely a word. The New York Times covers this hard evidence of
Bush's fabrication of a casus belli as some "British" elections story.
Apparently, our President's fraud isn't "news fit to print."

My colleagues in the UK press have skewered Blair, digging out more
incriminating memos, challenging the official government factoids and fibs. But
in the US press … nada, bubkes, zilch. Bush fixed the facts and somehow that's a
story for "over there."

The Republicans impeached Bill Clinton over his cigar and Monica's affections.
And the US media could print nothing else.

Now, we have the stone, cold evidence of bending intelligence to sell us on
death by the thousands, and neither a Republican Congress nor what is laughably
called US journalism thought it worth a second look.

My friend Daniel Ellsberg once said that what's good about the American people
is that you have to lie to them. What's bad about Americans is that it's so
easy to do.

Greg Palast, former columnist for Britain's Guardian papers, is the author of
the New York Times bestseller, The Best Democracy Money Can Buy.
Subscribe to his columns at Media requests to
contact(at) Permission to reprint with attribution granted.

[Here it is - the secret smoking gun memo - discovered by the Times of London. -

From: Matthew Rycroft
Date: 23 July 2002
S 195 /02

cc: Defence Secretary, Foreign Secretary, Attorney-General, Sir Richard Wilson,
John Scarlett, Francis Richards, CDS, C, Jonathan Powell, Sally Morgan,
Alastair Campbell


Copy addressees and you met the Prime Minister on 23 July to discuss Iraq.

This record is extremely sensitive. No further copies should be made. It should
be shown only to those with a genuine need to know its contents.

John Scarlett summarised the intelligence and latest JIC assessment. Saddam's
regime was tough and based on extreme fear. The only way to overthrow it was
likely to be by massive military action. Saddam was worried and expected an
attack, probably by air and land, but he was not convinced that it would be
immediate or overwhelming. His regime expected their neighbours to line up with
the US. Saddam knew that regular army morale was poor. Real support for Saddam
among the public was probably narrowly based.

C reported on his recent talks in Washington. There was a perceptible shift in
attitude. Military action was now seen as inevitable. Bush wanted to remove
Saddam, through military action, justified by the conjunction of terrorism and
WMD. But the intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy. The NSC
had no patience with the UN route, and no enthusiasm for publishing material on
the Iraqi regime's record. There was little discussion in Washington of the
aftermath after military action.

CDS said that military planners would brief CENTCOM on 1-2 August, Rumsfeld on 3
August and Bush on 4 August.

The two broad US options were:

(a) Generated Start. A slow build-up of 250,000 US troops, a short (72 hour) air
campaign, then a move up to Baghdad from the south. Lead time of 90 days (30
days preparation plus 60 days deployment to Kuwait).

(b) Running Start. Use forces already in theatre (3 x 6,000), continuous air
campaign, initiated by an Iraqi casus belli. Total lead time of 60 days with
the air campaign beginning even earlier. A hazardous option.

The US saw the UK (and Kuwait) as essential, with basing in Diego Garcia and
Cyprus critical for either option. Turkey and other Gulf states were also
important, but less vital. The three main options for UK involvement were:

(i) Basing in Diego Garcia and Cyprus, plus three SF squadrons.

(ii) As above, with maritime and air assets in addition.

(iii) As above, plus a land contribution of up to 40,000, perhaps with a
discrete role in Northern Iraq entering from Turkey, tying down two Iraqi

The Defence Secretary said that the US had already begun "spikes of activity" to
put pressure on the regime. No decisions had been taken, but he thought the most
likely timing in US minds for military action to begin was January, with the
timeline beginning 30 days before the US Congressional elections.

The Foreign Secretary said he would discuss this with Colin Powell this week. It
seemed clear that Bush had made up his mind to take military action, even if the
timing was not yet decided. But the case was thin. Saddam was not threatening
his neighbours, and his WMD capability was less than that of Libya, North Korea
or Iran. We should work up a plan for an ultimatum to Saddam to allow back in
the UN weapons inspectors. This would also help with the legal justification
for the use of force.

The Attorney-General said that the desire for regime change was not a legal base
for military action. There were three possible legal bases: self-defence,
humanitarian intervention, or UNSC authorisation. The first and second could
not be the base in this case. Relying on UNSCR 1205 of three years ago would be
difficult. The situation might of course change.

The Prime Minister said that it would make a big difference politically and
legally if Saddam refused to allow in the UN inspectors. Regime change and WMD
were linked in the sense that it was the regime that was producing the WMD.
There were different strategies for dealing with Libya and Iran. If the
political context were right, people would support regime change. The two key
issues were whether the military plan worked and whether we had the political
strategy to give the military plan the space to work.

On the first, CDS said that we did not know yet if the US battleplan was
workable. The military were continuing to ask lots of questions.

For instance, what were the consequences, if Saddam used WMD on day one, or if
Baghdad did not collapse and urban warfighting began? You said that Saddam
could also use his WMD on Kuwait. Or on Israel, added the Defence Secretary.

The Foreign Secretary thought the US would not go ahead with a military plan
unless convinced that it was a winning strategy. On this, US and UK interests
converged. But on the political strategy, there could be US/UK differences.
Despite US resistance, we should explore discreetly the ultimatum. Saddam would
continue to play hard-ball with the UN.

John Scarlett assessed that Saddam would allow the inspectors back in only when
he thought the threat of military action was real.

The Defence Secretary said that if the Prime Minister wanted UK military
involvement, he would need to decide this early. He cautioned that many in the
US did not think it worth going down the ultimatum route. It would be important
for the Prime Minister to set out the political context to Bush.


(a) We should work on the assumption that the UK would take part in any military
action. But we needed a fuller picture of US planning before we could take any
firm decisions. CDS should tell the US military that we were considering a
range of options.

(b) The Prime Minister would revert on the question of whether funds could be
spent in preparation for this operation.

(c) CDS would send the Prime Minister full details of the proposed military
campaign and possible UK contributions by the end of the week.

(d) The Foreign Secretary would send the Prime Minister the background on the UN
inspectors, and discreetly work up the ultimatum to Saddam.

He would also send the Prime Minister advice on the positions of countries in
the region especially Turkey, and of the key EU member states.

(e) John Scarlett would send the Prime Minister a full intelligence update.

(f) We must not ignore the legal issues: the Attorney-General would consider
legal advice with FCO/MOD legal advisers.

(I have written separately to commission this follow-up work.)


(Rycroft was a Downing Street foreign policy aide)

Greg Palast, former columnist for Britain's Guardian papers, is the author of
the New York Times bestseller, The Best Democracy Money Can Buy.
Subscribe to his columns at Media requests to
contact(at) Permission to reprint with attribution granted.

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